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Microeconomic studies have found cash flow to be important for the investment decision and this 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the conventional Tobin‘s q model corporate investment is driven entirely by Tobin‘s q 
while demand, uncertainty, cash flow and credit play no role for the investment decision 
(Hayashi, 1982). However, empirical evidence suggests that corporate investment is only 
weakly  related  to  Tobin‘s  q  while  income  and,  particularly,  cash  flow  appear  to  be  the 
principal force behind fluctuations in investment (see for discussion Blanchard, Rhee and 
Summers,  1993,  and  Romer,  2006,  Ch.  8).  Using  microeconomic  evidence,  most  of  the 
investment literature finds a strong link between investment and cash flow or other measures 
of internal funds and interprets it as evidence of credit market imperfections. ―Indeed, for 
most  part  the  literature  on  financial  market  imperfections  is  one  of  unusual  empirical 
consensus‖ (Romer, 2006, p 430).  
There  are,  however,  three  problems  associated  with  this  interpretation  of  nexus 
between investment and cash flow. First, cash-flow is not always an important determinant of 
investment in macroeconomic studies. Greasley and Madsen (2006), for example, find that 
the  importance  of  cash-flow  in  determining  investment  diminishes  substantially  once 
uncertainty is allowed for in the regressions.  
Second, if cash-flow does indeed proxy credit constraints, it does not reveal the type 
of credit constraint that is relevant for the investment decision. Almost all the empirical cash-
flow literature interprets the positive influence of cash-flow on investment as evidence for the 
adverse selection hypothesis  (Bernanke,  Gertler and their collaborators; see  for overview 
Bernanke, 1983, and Romer, 2006). In the models interpreting these findings, lenders have 
the capacity to distinguish the risk characteristics of potential borrowers and can optimally 
price each borrower‘s investment proposition  such that reduced lending only occurs as  a 
result of borrowers being priced out of the market as opposed to being rationed out. In other 
words, the interest rates charged by banks vary from firm to firm depending on the riskiness 
of the investment project. However, while often implied from the results, microeconomic 
cash-flow regressions do not give information about how credit influences investment. In 
particular, whether credit dynamics are important because they function to price firms out of 
the market  or because they create incentives  to  restrain  the quantity of credit able to  be 
accessed by firms cannot be ascertained from the empirical tests. In the models of Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), Blinder (1987), and Stiglitz (1988), banks cannot distinguish good from bad 
borrowers. Thus, it is optimal for banks to constrain the quantity of credit in times of high 3 
 
expected default rates. Whether some firms are priced out of the market or most firms are 
credit constrained have markedly different policy implications. 
Third, cash-flow regressions are consistent with several other theories of investment 
in which credit does not play an explicit role. Steigum (1983) and Blanchard, Rhee and 
Summers (1993) propose that if firms act in the interest of new stock holders they should 
follow the fundamental value of stocks when they make their investment decision, where the 
fundamental value of stocks is reflected in cash-flows. Similarly, Romer (2006, Ch. 8) argues 
that  firms  with  high  cash  flow  may  have  low  costs  or  produce  successful  products  and, 
therefore, have strong incentives to expand their production capacity quite independently of 
credit constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that the positive relationship between 
investment and cash flow is not necessarily increasing in the degree of financing constraints 
but reflects precautionary savings motives, overly risk-averse managers or managers who 
otherwise choose to finance investment from internal cash flows. Their empirical estimates of 
the  relationship  between  cash-flow  and  credit  constraints  reveal  a  negative  correlation 
between  the  sensitivity  of  investment  to  cash  flow  and  financing  constraints.  Finally, 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) devise a model where productivity cycles and the distribution of 
wealth between lenders and entrepreneurs are the drivers of the investment cycle, and agency 
costs in financial markets are a by-product. In this case a positive relationship between cash 
flow and investment could exist, but there is not necessarily a causal relationship between the 
two.  
Overall, although the financial market imperfection hypothesis is intuitive appealing, 
the  tests  using  cash  flow  do  not  test  the  theory  in  its  own  right.  Furthermore,  the 
microeconomic  evidence,  in  itself  open  to  debate,  is  not  confirmed  by  corresponding 
macroeconomic evidence that relates investment with imperfections in the financial markets.  
This  paper  seeks  to  overcome  these  concerns  by  using  a  direct  measure  of  the 
availability of credit for private corporate investment, namely survey evidence on banks‘ 
willingness to lend. This measure is an excellent measure of the availability of credit because 
it directly measures the degree to which firms are credit constrained on a macroeconomic 
level and no indirect measures are needed in the regression analysis. To our best knowledge, 
this is the first paper to consider the influence of banks‘ willingness to lend on corporate 
investment. Not only does banks‘ willingness to lend circumvent previous concerns regarding 
the causal relationship between finance constraints and the sensitivity of investment to cash 4 
 
flow,  it  enables  one  to  test  this  at  an  aggregate  level  and,  as  such,  gives  clear  macro 
predictions about the relationship between investment and the supply of credit.  
Moreover, capturing the relative ease of credit access to firms for investment, banks‘ 
willingness to lend permits one to verify the form of market imperfections. In particular, this 
analysis  allows  a  distinction  as  to  whether  it  is  the  supply  of  credit  at  given  terms 
constraining  investment  or  whether  the  external  premium  on  financing  firm  investment 
simply prices firms out of the finance market. The data also overcome the problems of using 
credit  aggregates  as  proxies  for  credit  availability.  The  volume  of  aggregate  credit  is 
determined by both  supply and demand.  In a state of low credit demand, credit may be 
reflected in low credit aggregates even if banks are willing to lend out (Jaffee and Modigliani, 
1969). Furthermore, even if credit has been tightened, the aggregate credit often continues to 
increase because credit lines are extended for firms experiencing declining cash flow so as 
lenders can avoid bankruptcy costs (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1969). 
Fundamentally, this research addresses the important questions in the literature on 
investment, namely; 1) what explains the often-found strong link between investment, cash 
flow and income; 2) are capital market imperfections influential for investment because of 
quantity constraints as predicted by the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), or because some 
borrowers are priced out of the market due to increased costs of credit provision; 3) what are 
the driving forces behind the large investment fluctuations observed at the macro level; and 
4) are credit market imperfections important for investment fluctuations once income, cash 
flow, and uncertainty are allowed for in the regressions? 
  The next  section gives informal evidence on the relationship  between investment, 
Tobin‘s  q,  the  profit  rate  and  uncertainty.  Section  3  extends  the  conventional  Tobin‘s  q 
framework to allow for demand and credit constraints. Section 4 estimates the relationship 
between investment, credit constraints, and Tobin‘s q, while the estimates in Section 5 extend 
the model to allow for the fundamental value of the firm, income and uncertainty. In Section 
6 the model is simulated to provide information about the factors that have shaped investment 
in the US over the past two decades. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  The nexus between investment, credit, income, Tobin’s q and uncertainty 
Figure 1 depicts the four-quarter change in those variables most commonly considered as 
determinants of investment, in addition to willingness to lend: the investment rate, Tobin‘s q, 
the profit rate (cash-flow), uncertainty and willingness to lend. The investment and real after-5 
 
tax profit rates are measured as a proportion of total capital stock. Uncertainty here reflects 
uncertainty  in  returns  to  investment  and  is  measured  as  the  standard  deviation  of  daily 
S&P500 data over each quarter following Greasley and Madsen (2006). Willingness to lend 
is measured as one minus the fraction of responding banks that affirmed tightened standards. 
Credit standards are transformed to four-quarter changes in standards by summing over the 
past four quarters of ‗changing credit standards‘.
1 Survey data recording the willingness to 
lend of U.S. domestic banks and foreign bank‘s agencies in the U.S. to firms for commercial 
and investment loans has been collected on a quarterly basis since 1990.1Q as part of the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank‘s  Senior  Loan  Officer  Opinion  Survey  on  bank  lending  practices 
(2010). The most recent survey used collected responses from 55 U.S. domestic banks and 21 
U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. Essentially, the willingness to lend data pertains 
to the question of ―Over the past three months, how have your bank's credit standards for 
approving applications for C&I loans or credit lines—other than those to be used to finance 
mergers and acquisitions—to large and middle-market firms and to small firms changed?‖ 
Data is available for large and medium firms and small firms separately. Large and medium 
firms are defined as those with annual sales of $50 million and more and small firms those 
with sales of less than $50 million. Data construction and data sources are detailed in the 
Data Appendix. 
 
Figure 1.  The relationship of Investment with Tobin‘s q, Profit rate, Willingness to Lend and 
Uncertainty 
                                                           
1 Defining  t C ln '   as the change in credit standards relative to credit standards in the previous quarter, where 
'   as the one-quarter difference operator, then the four-quarter sum of changing credit standards can be written 
as: 
3 2 1 ln ' ln ' ln ' ln '           t t t t C C C C ) ln (ln ) ln (ln 2 1 1        t t t t C C C C  
) ln (ln ) ln (ln 4 3 3 2         t t t t C C C C t t t C C C ln ) ln (ln 4      , 
where C is the four quarter change in credit standards. The equation shows that the four-period sum of changing 
credit standards measures the change in willingness to lend relative to four quarters earlier.  6 
 
      
(a) Investment and Tobin’s q      (b) Investment and Profit rate    
      
(c) Investment and Willingness to Lend (WTL)      (d) Investment and Uncertainty 
Notes. The data are measured as the percentage change from the quarter one year before. The investment and 
profit rates are measured as the amount of investment and after tax profit as a proportion of total capital stock. 
The profit measurement is corporate profits after tax and is deflated by the economy-wide value-added price 
deflator. Willingness to lend is measured as one minus the fraction of banks reporting tightened credit standards 
and is estimated as a weighted average of large and small firms. Uncertainty measures the volatility of the US 
S&P 500 firms calculated as the standard deviation of the daily stock price index over 90 day periods. All the 
data are normalized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for comparative purposes. See the data 
appendix for construction of the data and data sources. 
 
Several  observations  are made in  visually  comparing these data. First, the two measures 
holding up strongest  in their comparison  with  investment  emerge  as  willingness  to  lend, 
followed by Tobin‘s q. Both of these indicators explain the two major upturns and downturns 
in  investment  over  the  past  two  decades  and  appear  to  lead  investment  by  one  or  two 
quarters. However, while willingness to lend has not given any false signals about investment 
in the considered period, Tobin‘s q has moved inversely with investment during the periods 
1992-1995 and 2003-2004, suggesting that willingness to lend is a more reliable driver or 
predictor  of  investment  than  Tobin‘s  q.  The  question  remains  as  to  whether  Tobin‘s  q 7 
 
provides  information  independently  of  willingness  to  lend  that  can  help  explaining 
investment. This issue is addressed in the empirical section. 
Second, given the prior consensus regarding the role of cash flows for investment, it is 
interesting to note that profits look to correlate much less with investment than willingness to 
lend and Tobin‘s q. While investment growth is a smooth series, growth in the profit rate 
often gives false signals about investment as confirmed by the study of Greasley and Madsen 
(2006) covering a century of data. Furthermore, apart from the most recent decline, the profit 
rate  failed  to  correlate  with  large  swings  in  investment.  Although  the  macro  level  data 
analysed  here  are  not  directly  comparable  with  the  firm  level  data  used  in  most  of  the 
previous studies, the aggregate data does seem to reflect the ambiguity of the findings in the 
literature. Third, visually there is no clear correlation between investment and uncertainty, 
which, to some extent, reflects that the change in the variance of stock prices by nature is 
volatile and that uncertainty and investment go in reverse. Taking these factors into account, 
the figure shows that uncertainty and investment move in opposite directions giving some 
evidence of the uncertainty hypothesis of Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  
 
3.  Theoretical framework 
This section extends the Tobin‘s q model of corporate investment by Blanchard (1983) by 
incorporating credit constraints. In Blanchard‘s (1983) model, demand is influential for non-
residential investment because goods markets fail to clear.  It is assumed that the cost of 
borrowing is set exogenously by the international credit market in a fixed exchange rate 
regime, or by monetary authorities under flexible exchange rates. An endogenous discount 
rate is not considered since it increases the complexity of the model without affecting the 
steady-state properties of the model nor giving additional insight into the influence of credit 
and demand shocks on capital stock and equity prices (see Madsen and Davis, 2006, for an 
extension of the model to allow for an endogenous discount rate). Taxes are omitted for 
simplicity. 
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where b is the fraction of investment financed by debt; r is the required returns of owners of 
the firm, i is the nominal interest rate paid by the investor on debt finance; I is investment; K 
is the capital stock of the individual investor;   is convex investment adjustment costs which 
are  symmetric  in  investment  and,  as  standard  in  the  literature,  is  given  by 
K I K K 2 / ) / (
2     ; L is the labour used in production measured in effective labour hours; w 
is real wages; and π is the inflation rate. A dot over a variable signifies the absolute change 
over time.    L K F ,  is a well-behaved production function. The last term,    K b , is the 
inflation-induced reduction in the real value of debt.  
The  representative  investor  makes  their  investment  decision  subject  to  the  capital 
accumulation constraint:  
I K   .                   (3) 
 
Depreciation is ignored for simplicity without affecting the results. Also for simplicity, it is 
assumed that all investment is debt financed and therefore b = 1. The credit constraint can 
therefore be written such that investment is capped at  I which is the maximum amount of 


















 1 .                (4) 
Limitations on demand for investment output are also considered as a constraining influence 
for investment. A rational and forward looking investor will only invest where demand for 
investment output is positive, thus investment output is also constrained by the quantity of 
output demanded, Q: 
 
  L K F Q ,                    (5) 
 
Combining (1)-(5), the explicit adjustment cost function and the condition that all investment 
is debt financed yields the current-value Hamiltonian of the representative investor: 
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where   , q and μ are the shadow values,  1 0    and  1 0    . Here,    is the present 
value to the investor of loosening up the credit constraint by one unit, q is the present value of 
an additional unit of capital stock and μ is the present value to the investor of loosening up 
the demand constraint by one unit. 
The  first  order  conditions  other  than  those  that  restate  the  constraints  and  the 
transversality condition are as follows:  
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Equation (7) specifies the no arbitrage equilibrium; the investor will balance the present value 
of the future marginal product of capital, accounting for inflation and adjustment costs, with 
the required return. Condition (8) shows that the value to the investor of obtaining one unit of 
capital at the margin depends on the acquisition costs inclusive of the shadow cost of debt 
and marginal adjustment costs.  
To solve for the equation specifying the dynamic behaviour of investment, equation 
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Equation (9) says that any wedge developed between the value of capital to the investor and 
the acquisition cost of capital will drive supply side responses such that the shadow cost 
equals the acquisition cost of capital.  
  Equation  (9)  is  the  key  equation  in  the  paper.  It  shows  that  the  investment  ratio 
depends solely on Tobin‘s q and credit constraints. The more credit constrained are firms, the 
higher is   and the higher is the benchmark level of q at which investment is undertaken. It 
is noticeable that demand constraints do not enter the investment decision. This is because 
demand  constraints  go  through  the  channel  of  q.  Increased  demand  relaxes  the  demand 
constraint  and  increases  the  value  of  the  marginal  productivity  of  capital  (through  the 
term      1 K F   in  Eq.  (7)),  which  in  turn  increases  the  present  value  of  the  firm  and 
consequently q. The higher q initiates a capital deepening process. Thus, in this framework 
the investment decision is independent of demand. 10 
 
 
4.  Empirics 
This section tests the empirical implications of the model derived in the previous section. In 
the first part of this section it is tested whether Tobin‘s q and willingness to lend can explain 
corporate investment. The second part of the section tests the robustness of the results by 
extending the model to allow for uncertainty, default risk, credit demand, output demand, 
and cash-flow. 
  In the previous section it was shown that the investment ratio is a function of Tobin‘s 
q  and  credit constraints  (Eq. 9). Before extending the model to  allow for other control 















 ,        (10) 
 
where    is  the  four-quarter  difference  operator,  I  is  real  private  non-residential  fixed 
investment, K is real private non-residential capital stock, C is banks‘ willingness to lend, q is 
Tobin‘s q as measured by the capitalized value of the capital stock divided by the acquisition 
cost  of  capital  at  current  costs,  and     is  a  stochastic  error  term.  As  in  Figure  1, C  is 
willingness  to  lend,  and  is  measured  as  one  minus  the  proportion  of  banks  who  have 
tightened their credit for large companies (those with annual sales of $50 million and more), 
small companies (the remainder), and a weighted average of the two. Thus, we would expect 
the coefficient of willingness to lend to be positive. 
 
Table 1. Parameter estimates of Eq. (10).  
  Average  Big  Small 
Dependent 
variable    


























∆Ct-2  0.032 
(0.969) 
  0.033 
(1.169) 




∆Ct-3  0.014 
(0.437) 
  -0.007 
(-0.228) 




∆Ct-4  -0.008 
(-0.344) 
  0.005 
(0.265) 
  -0.019 
-(0.858) 
 
∆ln qt-1  -0.003  
(-0.081) 
  0.009 
(0.270) 
  -0.011 
(-0.343) 
 
∆ln qt-2  0.044  
(1.059) 
  0.029 
(0.689) 
  0.061 
(1.510) 
 
∆ln qt-3  -0.012  
(-0.292) 
  -0.008 
(-0.195) 
  0.008 
(-0.200) 
 
∆ln qt-4  -0.022 
(0.588) 
  0.034 
(0.863) 




2  0.926  0.932  0.921  0.816  0.931  0.935 
Notes.  The  figures  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics.  The  t-statistics  are  based  on  the  Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  consistent  covariance  matrix.  The  coefficients  of  C  are 
multiplied by 1000. C is measured as the change in willingness to lend for a weighted average of large 
companies (those with annual sales of $50 million and more) and small companies (the remainder) in 
the first two columns. The third and fourth columns are for large companies and the last two columns 
are willingness to lend to small companies. * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% 
level, and *** = significant at the 1% level. 
 
The  standard  errors  are  based  on  the  Newey-West  autocorrelation  and 
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. All the explanatory variables are lagged one 
to  four  periods  to  capture  the  dynamic  adjustment  of  investment  to  its  determinants. 
Contemporary and further lags of q and C were initially included in the regressions; however, 
the  estimated  coefficients  were  insignificant  and  consequently  omitted.
2  The  model  is 
estimated for the US over the period 1991.2Q -2009.1Q. Results of general and specific 
models are presented in the tables below, where coefficients in the specific  models are 
restricted to zero using the general-to-specific model reduction procedure (the variable with 
the most insignificant coefficient is deleted in each regression round until all coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level excluding the constant term). 
The results of estimating Eq. (10) are presented in Table 1.  The estimated coefficient 
of willingness to lend is statistically highly significant  in all the estimates in Table 1. The 
elasticity of willingness to lend is slightly higher for firms with annual sales of less than $50 
million, which  is not surprising given that smaller firms  have been found to be   more 
dependent on credit for external finance than larger firms  (Lízal and Svejnar, 2002). The 
significance of C gives very strong empirical support to our hypothesis that willingness to 
                                                           
2 Contemporary q was instrumented using two lags of q, per capita income and cash-flow. Contemporary C was 
instrumented using two lags of C, per capita income and cash-flow. 12 
 
lend is an essential factor behind investment dynamics and confirms the visual impression in 
Figure 1 that banks’ willingness to lend explains a large part of investment fluctuations. 
Further support for the credit hypothesis is given by the fact that willingness to lend precedes 
investment  with  a  lead  time  3-6  months.  While  precedence  is  no  proof  of  causality,  it 
nevertheless precludes that investment drives willingness to lend and if anything, suggests the 
opposite direction of influence.  
  Turning  to  the  estimated  coefficients  of  Tobin‘s  q,  these  are  insignificant  in  all 
general as well as specific regressions. Looking at Figure 1a this result is not surprising. 
Since the movements in Tobin‘s q are much more erratic than the investment ratio due to the 
large fluctuations in the stock market, growth in Tobin‘s q is unlikely to be a good predictor 
of growth in investment on quarterly frequencies. Using annual data there is a much stronger 
relationship between investment and q and willingness to lend remains a significant variable 
explaining investment (the results are not shown). Thus, the insignificance of  q does not 
mean that it is an unimportant variable explaining investment; only that q does not explain 
quarterly-frequency changes in investment. 
 
4.2 Allowing  for  the  effects  of  income,  uncertainty,  default  risk,  cash-flow  and 
demand for credit 
 
To  investigate  the  influence  of  other  variables  on  investment  and  to  test  whether  the 
significance of the willingness to lend variable is robust to the inclusion of other variables, 
the model is extended with variables that are often considered important for the investment 
decision in the investment literature. These are uncertainty, income, the interest rate spread, 
default  risk  and  profits.  Unrestricted  and  restricted  versions  of  the  following  model  are 
regressed using OLS:  
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where Y is per capita real income, Sp is the interest rate spread between corporate bonds BAA 
and a treasury bond rate of the same term to maturity,  is the profit rate, Var is uncertainty 
and D survey evidence on the demand for credit. The profit rate is measured as nominal after 13 
 
tax profits divided by real capital stock and is deflated by the economy-wide, value-added 
price deflator.  
Following  the  standard  in  the  literature,  uncertainty  is  calculated  as  the  standard 
deviation of the daily US S&P 500 during each quarter (see for example Romer, 1990, and 
Greasley  and  Madsen,  2006).  This  measure  is  also  theory  consistent.  Dixit  and  Pindyck 
(1994) show that investment is negatively related to uncertainty because it lowers expected 
returns under asymmetric adjustment costs. In conditions of heightened uncertainty it may be 
preferable to wait for more information than to invest immediately because it will be difficult 
to recoup the investment layouts of failed investment projects. Thus, there is an option value 
of  waiting  for  more  information,  which  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  uncertainty 
surrounding the present value of expected cash flow. Since the price of an option, in addition 
to the interest rate on a risk-free asset is determined by the variance of the asset, it follows 
that our measure of uncertainty is consistent with what it is supposed to measure. 
  The  interest  rate  spread  is  included  in  the  regressions  to  cater  for  default  risks. 
According to Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000), default risk, reflecting uncertainty in borrower 
risk, can also have an important impact on investment when equity markets are imperfect and 
there is uncertainty about expected returns. The credit spread has often been used as a proxy 
for adverse selection in the credit markets under the assumption that an increase in the spread 
reflects heightened risk of lending out to the most risky borrowers and, consequently, leads to 
adverse selection (see for instance Bernanke, 1983, and Mishkin, 1990).  
  Income is included in the regressions following the accelerator principle in which 
investment is determined by demand forces. There is no strong rationale as to why income 
should be a determinant of investment; however, in  his survey of the literature Chirinko 
(1993)  concludes that  income is  a very  robust determinant of investment.  It  is  not clear 
whether income determines investment of demand constrained firms, proxies cash-flow of the 
cash-constrained firm,  proxies  the expected returns to  investment,  or that firms  invest  to 
optimize its turnover or a combination of them. Since most of these arguments are contained 
in Eq. (10) the estimates below will reveal whether income contains independent information 
on investment that is not accounted for by q, credit, cash-flow, and expected returns.  
  Cash-flow,  as  discussed in  the  Introduction, is  often considered important  for the 
investment decision as it is assumed to proxy the credit constrains of firms or because it 
reflects the fundamental value of firms as argued by Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993). If 
the discount rate is expected to remain constant into the future and if the current profit rate 14 
 
reflects expected profits, the fundamental value of a share is dictated by the profit rate. The 
fundamental value of firms is more relevant than Tobin‘s q in the investment decision if firms 
act in the interest of the future stockholders and if stock prices are disjointed from their 
fundamental value.  
As a final check on the model it is investigated as to the extent to which the quantity 
of credit is driven by the demand, as opposed to the supply, of credit. Jaffee and Modigliani 
(1969), for example, stressed that simple proxies of the availability of credit such as the credit 
volume and cash-flow are influenced by the demand as well as supply for credit and, as such, 
fail to identify the source of variations in the credit flow. To test for the importance of credit 
demand,  data  pertaining  to  reported  investment  demand  for  Commercial  and  Investment 
Loans in the Federal Reserve Bank‘s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on bank lending 
practices (20) are used. The question asked in the survey is ―Apart from normal seasonal 
variation, how has demand for C&I loans changed over the past three months?‖ The average 
percentage  of  firms  reporting  stronger  demand  is  used  as  the  variable  for  the  empirical 
estimations. 
 
4.2.1 Estimates of the general model  
Unrestricted and restricted estimates of Eq. (11) are displayed in Table 2. Willingness to lend 
is measured as the weighted average of small and large firms since the results are not very 
sensitive to  whether  C is  measured for small,  large  or the average. Considering first the 
unrestricted model, the estimated coefficients of willingness to lend, q, uncertainty, profit 
rates and income are statistically significant determinants of  investment. Excepting profit 
rates, these variables remain significant in the specific model, although the higher order lags 
of  q  lose  their  significance  during  the  model  reduction.  More  specifically,  the  estimated 
coefficients  of  variables  Ct-1,  qt-1,  Yt-1,  Vart-2,  Vart-4,  are  significant  at  the  five  or  one-
percentage significance levels in the specific model. The significance of income confirms the 
conclusion of Chrinko (1993) that income remains an important determinant of investment, 
even if other relevant determinants of investment are included in the regressions. This could 
indicate that firms are demand constrained because they do not adjust prices sufficiently in 
response  to  demand  fluctuations  or  that  the  firm  has  objectives  other  than  profit 
maximization.  
The coefficients of the interest spread and cash flow variables are all insignificant. 
The unimportance of the interest rate spread and cash-flow is remarkable because they are 15 
 
often found to be significant determinants of investment in the microeconomic literature as 
discussed  in  the  Introduction.  This  result  may  be  related  to  Romer‘s  (2006)  critique  of 
microeconomic studies that cash-flow often proxies the performance of management, cost 
efficiencies, and the general success of the firm and that cash-flow may not be related to the 
availability of credit at all. In fact, the results are consistent with the macroeconomic study of 
Greasley and Madsen (2006) on US investment over the past century. This ambiguity also 
provides support for the hypothesis that the marginal productivity of cash flows differs across 
firms and time (Bacchetta and Caminal, 2000, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997). 
 
 
Table 2. General to specific estimations using all variables  
Dependent variable    General  Specific 




∆Ct-1  -0.036 
(-1.285) 
 




∆Ct-3  -0.012 
(-0.284) 
 
∆Ct-4  0.004 
(0.131) 
 




∆ln qt-2  -0.021 
(-0.332) 
 
∆ln qt-3  -0.116** 
(-1.970) 
 
∆ln qt-4  0.127*** 
(3.512) 
 




∆ln Yt-2  0.906 
(1.628) 
 
∆ln Yt-3  0.044 
(0.084) 
 
∆ln Yt-4  -0.532 
(0.084) 
 
∆ Vart-1  -0.000 
(-0.340) 
 




∆Vart-3  -0.000** 
(-2.029) 
 




∆ Spt-1  -0.005 
(-1.014) 
 




∆ Spt-3  -0.001 
(-0.270) 
 
∆ Spt-4  -0.006 
(-1.075) 
 
∆ln  t-1  -0.068** 
(-2.247) 
 
∆ln  t-2  0.085** 
(2.337) 
 
∆ln  t-3  -0.043 
(-1.152) 
 
∆ln  t-4  -0.039 
(-1.395) 
 
∆Dt-1  -0.000** 
(-2.192)) 
 
∆Dt-2  0.000 
(0.795) 
 
∆Dt-3  0.000 
(0.652) 
 




2  0.908  0.902 
Notes. See notes to Table 1. Willingness to lend is measured as a weighted average of small and large 
firms. 
 
In conjunction with the significance of C, the insignificance of the interest spread suggests 
that  credit  providers  do  not,  or  cannot,  differentiate  between  the  qualities  of  different 
categories  borrowers  by  charging  higher  interest  rates  on  risky  loans  as  proposed  by 
Bernanke (1983). Instead there are ebbs and flows in the availability of credit and risky as 
well as good borrowers will be affected by banks‘ willingness to lend. The global financial 
crisis and the lead up to it certainly confirms this mechanism. It appears that good and bad 
housing borrowers could obtain credit during the upturn while it has recently become difficult 
for most borrowers to obtain credit (Federal Reserve Bank, 2010). 
Finally, the credit demand variables are insignificant in the specific models. This infers 
that the flow of credit to firms that is important for capital accumulation is determined by 
banks willingness to lend rather than by demand for credit; supply constraints dominate the 
credit-investment relationship. This is a very important result because it shows that credit 
aggregates are driven by supply of credit and, more importantly, that policy initiatives to 
stimulate the flow of credit is downturns and discourage the flow of credit in upturns can be 
effectively regulated by quantity and price controls on the supply side. 
 
5.  Simulations 
While the results in the previous section show that willingness to lend, Tobin‘s q, income and 
uncertainty are statistically significant short-term determinants of investment, their economic 17 
 
significance in explaining the growth cycles has not been shown. To that end the coefficient 
estimates of the specific model in Table 2 are used to simulate the contribution of each of the 
explanatory variables to investment growth since 1991.  
  First,  however,  consider  predicted  versus  the  actual  investment  growth  over  the 
estimation period. The model predicts investment  remarkably well. It predicts all turning 
points, explains ups and downs and even relatively small changes in the investment growth 




Notes: The predictions are from the specific model reported in Table 2.  
 
The model simulations are also presented numerically in Table 3. Willingness to lend and 
income growth explain most of the movements in investment growth closely followed by 
uncertainty. Tobin‘s q explains only a small part of investment growth. Considering the three 
downturns  in  investment  growth  (1991.1Q-1991.4Q,  2000.4Q-2003.3Q,  and  2007.4Q-
present),  willingness  to  lend  has  been  the  most  important  determinant  of  the  downturn 
followed  by  income  growth  and  uncertainty.  This  suggests  that  credit  crunches  play 
important roles during investment downturns.  
 
 
Table 3. Simulations 
Year  C  Y  VAR  q  Predicted  Actual 
1991.Q2  -5.42  -4.50  -1.13  0.05  -11.00  -8.32 18 
 
1991.Q3  -6.77  -3.76  -2.24  0.23  -12.54  -9.67 
1991.Q4  -5.04  -2.85  -0.79  0.62  -8.06  -8.00 
1992.Q1  -4.00  -0.46  -1.39  1.02  -4.83  -5.62 
1992.Q2  -2.49  2.54  -0.77  0.80  0.08  -0.61 
1992.Q3  -1.25  3.12  -0.53  0.41  1.74  2.37 
1992.Q4  -0.68  4.05  -0.76  0.40  3.00  5.81 
1993.Q1  -0.19  5.25  -0.45  0.43  5.04  6.70 
1993.Q2  0.11  3.49  -0.88  0.28  3.00  5.26 
1993.Q3  0.20  2.68  -0.62  0.30  2.55  4.20 
1993.Q4  0.26  1.83  -0.78  0.30  1.61  5.22 
1994.Q1  0.81  2.35  -0.71  0.32  2.77  5.46 
1994.Q2  1.32  4.12  -0.40  0.15  5.19  4.67 
1994.Q3  1.84  5.66  -0.68  -0.10  6.71  5.29 
1994.Q4  2.06  5.79  -0.49  -0.12  7.25  5.36 
1995.Q1  1.72  5.48  -0.79  -0.26  6.16  8.21 
1995.Q2  1.89  4.07  -0.68  -0.13  5.15  6.66 
1995.Q3  1.63  1.93  -1.11  0.51  2.96  5.28 
1995.Q4  1.47  2.42  -1.10  0.78  3.57  2.79 
1996.Q1  1.35  1.57  -1.23  1.05  2.74  1.14 
1996.Q2  0.76  2.43  -1.45  1.13  2.87  3.25 
1996.Q3  0.31  5.23  -1.55  0.82  4.81  5.74 
1996.Q4  0.04  5.26  -1.41  0.41  4.29  6.21 
1997.Q1  -0.01  6.08  -1.88  0.60  4.79  6.08 
1997.Q2  0.28  6.18  -1.82  0.67  5.31  5.49 
1997.Q3  0.70  5.95  -1.98  0.76  5.44  7.03 
1997.Q4  0.93  6.71  -3.79  1.40  5.26  4.96 
1998.Q1  0.97  5.90  -1.84  1.01  6.04  5.59 
1998.Q2  0.78  6.55  -3.65  1.02  4.71  5.98 
1998.Q3  0.49  4.94  -3.56  1.24  3.11  1.74 
1998.Q4  0.46  4.80  -1.88  0.50  3.88  3.90 
1999.Q1  0.41  6.31  -5.96  0.62  1.39  2.23 
1999.Q2  -0.81  5.82  -4.82  0.90  1.09  2.12 
1999.Q3  -0.96  6.14  -4.59  0.76  1.35  3.46 
1999.Q4  -1.50  6.16  -4.89  0.93  0.70  0.54 
2000.Q1  -1.75  6.65  -3.45  0.82  2.28  2.08 
2000.Q2  -0.95  5.51  -4.47  0.29  0.38  2.44 
2000.Q3  -1.13  6.97  -4.64  0.03  1.22  0.51 
2000.Q4  -1.68  4.57  -4.87  0.01  -1.97  0.46 
2001.Q1  -2.68  2.22  -3.91  -0.57  -4.93  -3.99 
2001.Q2  -3.87  1.52  -4.02  -1.12  -7.49  -10.93 
2001.Q3  -5.55  -0.87  -5.64  -1.39  -13.46  -12.84 
2001.Q4  -6.37  -1.31  -4.62  -1.81  -14.11  -16.19 
2002.Q1  -6.66  -1.53  -7.87  -1.39  -17.46  -17.98 
2002.Q2  -7.06  0.03  -4.09  -0.85  -11.97  -15.30 
2002.Q3  -6.71  0.51  -5.06  -0.94  -12.19  -13.54 19 
 
2002.Q4  -5.76  2.34  -4.07  -1.50  -8.99  -10.82 
2003.Q1  -4.86  1.71  -3.75  -1.46  -8.36  -7.74 
2003.Q2  -3.81  1.01  -4.21  -1.74  -8.75  -3.41 
2003.Q3  -2.79  1.61  -4.12  -0.91  -6.20  -0.59 
2003.Q4  -2.43  3.98  -4.16  0.40  -2.22  1.41 
2004.Q1  -2.04  5.16  -2.72  0.72  1.13  1.36 
2004.Q2  -1.24  6.02  -3.27  1.23  2.74  1.34 
2004.Q3  0.04  6.04  -1.80  0.59  4.87  1.97 
2004.Q4  1.32  4.27  -2.05  0.11  3.65  3.67 
2005.Q1  1.93  4.21  -1.76  0.04  4.42  5.13 
2005.Q2  2.67  4.19  -2.94  -0.18  3.74  3.97 
2005.Q3  2.83  3.80  -1.67  -0.15  4.81  2.42 
2005.Q4  2.93  3.91  -2.98  0.11  3.98  0.78 
2006.Q1  3.01  3.32  -1.36  -0.13  4.85  3.56 
2006.Q2  2.51  4.17  -2.86  -0.05  3.78  3.47 
2006.Q3  2.14  4.18  -1.29  -0.05  4.98  3.19 
2006.Q4  1.57  2.71  -3.17  -0.20  0.91  1.94 
2007.Q1  1.23  2.78  -2.19  0.24  2.06  -0.98 
2007.Q2  0.98  0.53  -2.74  0.14  -1.08  -0.04 
2007.Q3  0.53  1.52  -2.57  0.49  -0.02  0.75 
2007.Q4  0.18  3.40  -2.72  0.47  1.33  1.82 
2008.Q1  -0.34  2.60  -3.25  0.09  -0.90  1.52 
2008.Q2  -0.94  3.01  -3.62  -0.61  -2.16  -0.37 
2008.Q3  -2.08  2.10  -4.22  -0.88  -5.08  -2.88 
2008.Q4  -4.24  -0.38  -3.99  -1.34  -9.96  -9.75 
2009.Q1  -6.38  -3.31  -4.20  -2.79  -16.67  -16.17 
Notes: The predictions are from the specific model reported in Table 2.  
 
The evidence of very easy monetary policy up to the recent global financial crisis, as well as 
before  and  during  the  2001-2002  recession,  suggests  that  credit  crunches  need  not  be 
triggered by monetary policies but something completely different that may be endogenous to 
the banking system. Whether this reflects falling asset prices, falling liquidity and access to 
short-term funding, or changes in bankers‘ expectations is left for future research. What is 
important  here  is  that  the  simulations  show  that  willingness  to  lend  explains  investment 
downturns quite independently of the stance of monetary policy.  
  Turning to upturns, willingness to lend and income have been the prime movers of the 
investment  upturns.  During  the  1992-93  upturn,  willingness  to  lend  contributed  a  6 
percentage point turnaround in investment growth and income contributed about 5 percentage 
points. During the upturn in the period 2002.1Q to 2004.3Q willingness to lend contributed to 
more than an 8 percentage point turnaround in investment growth and income contributed to 
more than a 4 percentage point change in income growth rates.  20 
 
 
6.   Discussion and conclusion 
This is the first study to investigate the credit-investment nexus using a direct measure of 
credit availability while allowing for the influence on investment of Tobin‘s q, uncertainty, 
income,  cash-flow,  default  risk  and  the  demand  for  credit.  Earlier  studies  stressing  the 
importance  of  credit  as  a  source  of  investment  fluctuations  use  interest  spreads  between 
different  risk  classes  of  bonds,  cash-flow  and  bank  suspensions  as  proxies  for  adverse 
selection. Bernanke (1983), for example, argues that adverse selection was a main factor 
behind the investment collapse during the Great Depression using the interest rate spread 
between Baa Corporate bonds and long term U.S. Government bonds. The trouble with these 
proxies is that they proxy sources of investment fluctuations other than credit standards such 
as the fundamental value of shares and default risk. Survey evidence of bank‘s willingness to 
lend overcomes the problems associated with the use of credit proxies. 
  The estimates showed that willingness to lend, Tobin‘s q, income and uncertainty are 
all  statistically  significant  drivers  of  investment.  Model  simulations  were  additionally 
undertaken to gauge the economic significance of these variables in explaining investment 
fluctuations over the past two decades in the US. Movements in banks‘ willingness to lend 
have explained the bulk of the investment growth cycles over the past two decades followed 
by income, uncertainty and Tobin‘s q. As stressed in the text, the relatively low significance 
of Tobin‘s q in explaining investment is no indication of unimportance but rather that erratic 
stock market fluctuations render it less useful for explaining investment growth on quarterly 
frequencies.  Finally,  neither  the  interest  rate  spread  nor  cash  flow  have  any  statistically 
significant impact on investment growth suggesting that the fundamental value of stock and 
default risks, if correctly captured by their proxies, are not of significance in the investment 
decision. 
  The  significance  of  willingness  to  lend  in  the  regressions  and  simulations  has 
important macroeconomic implications. First, that the availability of credit is an important 
driver of investment on business cycle frequencies. Second, the cost of funding as reflected in 
Tobin‘s q is of minor importance for short-term movements in investment. Thus, monetary 
policies  that  influence  the  quantity  and  the  availability  of  credit  are  substantially  more 
effective in the investment decision than monetary policies that seek to influence corporate 
investment through interest rates policies. This result makes intuitive sense since an interest 
rate of three of five percent does not make much difference for an investment project with 21 
 
large  uncertainties  in  returns.  Furthermore,  the  empirical  results  suggest  that  the 
macroeconomic  literature  could  benefit  from  focusing  more  on  the  banking  sector  in 
explaining macroeconomic fluctuations. The banking sector is absent from most, if not all, 
general equilibrium models of income determination and simpler expositions and, as such, do 
not play a role in business cycle models. Third, heightened uncertainty, as reflected in stock 
price  gyrations,  are  often  associated  with  collapses  in  business  investment.  This  was 
witnessed during the recession surrounding the collapse of the dotcom bubble and 911. From 
a historical perspective, the stock price fluctuations during the Great Depression were several 
times greater than the fluctuations experienced in the downturns during the past two decades. 
While Greasley and Madsen (2006) showed that uncertainty played a major role during the 
Great Depression, the importance of credit constraints during that period remains unknown. 
 
Data appendix 
Tobin’s q  
Quarterly measures of Tobin‘s q were derived from Stephen Wright‘s q data calculated from the 
cyclically adjusted Price-to-Equity ratio (CAPE) (see http://www.smithers.co.uk).  
This data is available at monthly frequencies until December 2006 and were converted to quarterly 
figures by taking the quarterly averages. The data was updated until 2009.1Q using S&P500 deflated 
by consumer prices. 
 
Willingness to lend 
Sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank‘s quarterly survey, the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
on bank lending practices (Federal Reserve Bank, 2008).  
 
Small/Large firm weightings 
The U.S. Census Bureau publishes statistics regarding firm size that can be found on the website 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html . The table detailing receipt size of employer firms 
was used to calculate the small-large firm weightings for the weighted willingness to lend regression. 
 
Investment  
Annual rates of real private non-residential fixed investment (seasonally adjusted) were obtained at 




The perpetual inventory method with a 8% depreciation rate was used to calculate non-residential 
capital stock. Annual rates of Real Private Non-residential Fixed Investment (seasonally adjusted) 
were used in the calculations (obtained at quarterly intervals over the period1947:1Q-2009.1Q from 





The variance of equity prices is calculated as the standard deviation of daily S&P500 data within each 




Profit data was obtained on a quarterly basis from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis‘s Economic 
Data  base  (FRED)  at  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.  The  profit  measurement  used  was 
―Corporate Profits After Tax (Billions of Dollars) Seasonally Adjusted Annualized‖ deflated by the 
value-added price deflator. 
 
Income 
Income was taken as real income per capita. This measure is the seasonally adjusted annual rate of 
real Gross Domestic Product divided by total population. All original data was obtained at quarterly 
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